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Pavel: Fiction and the Ontological Landscape

FICTION AND THE ONTOLOGICAL
LANDSCAPE*
THOMAS G. PAVEL
Universite du Quebec a Montreal

Towards the end of the XVIIIth century, a new cosmology was
quite established in the European scientific milieux and was constantly conquering new social territories. Earlier, Fontenelle
described the pleasure and amazement with which a narrow French
elite came in touch with the recent astronomy. The Christian
cosmology was far from dead, however. At the very end of the century, the enormous success of Haydn's oratorio, The Creation, an
enthusiastic, open celebration of the old cosmology, cannot be attributed only to the beauty of the music. Indeed, in defiance of the
musical conventions of the period, The Creation relates the music
to the libretto in an almost literal way. Should one think that the
public was enjoying the oratorio despite its cosmology or because
of it? At least some of the contemporary admirers of Haydn must
have heard of the new theories about the planets moving around
the sun. They must have been peripherally aware of a certain
cosmology, while keeping their central commitments to an entirely
different one, similar to a child who at the age when it becomes
more and more obvious that Santa Claus doesn't exist, still clings
to his old beliefs, while marginally sensing that his convictions may
be obsolete.
Would thus the utter enjoyment of Haydn's Creation, libretto
included,' represent a case of playful ontological regression? Could
it be that, conversely, in other cases artistic fiction conveys ontological anticipation? Think of the godless world of some of
Marlowe's plays, or of the attributeless characters of Musil.
It is clear from such examples that the referential framework
posited by literary or more generally by artistic fiction does
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not necessarily function by virtue of the ontological structure attributed to the actual world. On the contrary, in many cases, the
ontology of fiction enters into complex conflictual relationships
with actual ontologies. Our questions will be: how should we
understand such conflicts? how are they solved? what are the consequences of these conflicts and their solutions for literary theory?
II

Usually, in the philosophical environment where discussions
about what there is take place, the participants are crucially interested in eliminating superfluous entities and in working with only one type of beings, the basic beings.' This remark applies to the
realist philosopher as well as to the instrumentalist, to the hardcore actualist, as well as to the proponent of possible-worlds
semantics. For, indeed, instrumentalism is an epistemological attitude, casting little doubt about the ontological properties of
things out there, questioning only our ability to grasp them
realistically. As for the possible-worlds semanticist, his endeavor
aims precisely at dispensing with the ontologically troublesome
possible beings, which conveniently become actual-in-somepossible world.
One attempt to break with this «reality fixation,» as Richard
Rout ley appropriately calls it, is provided by Meinongian ontology.' To every description there corresponds a being; some of
these possess actual existence, while others, lacking actuality, subsist only. For the theory of fiction, the Meinongian point of view is
most welcome. It accounts for a central intuition shared by users of
natural language and fiction, namely that when we speak about
some entity, we posit it as hypothetically being there in some ontological space, the nature of which remains to be determined from
case to case. «The best hockey player in the world,» «the longest
sentence in English,» «the present king of France,» «the square circle,» «God»-each of these expressions posits a being, whose actual
existence may be checked later on, but whose subsistence in some
kind of space we take for granted as soon as the expression is uttered and understood. In a Meinongian framework one may devise
a metrics for measuring in each case the distance between actuality
and the subsisting being, and elaborate about the nature of the
subsistence-space of each expression. Thus, «the longest sentence
in English» belongs to the non-actual physically impossible world
where humans would live eternally and utter infinite sentences;
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/8
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«the square circle» subsists in the non-actual logically impossible
world where the entities can possess contradictory properties, and
so on.
Still, from the point of view of the theory of fiction, a
Meinongian model does not go beyond a division of beings into two
categories: actual and non-actual. In earlier papers, I have argued
that in order to understand reference to mythological and fictional
beings, ontologies making use of only one realm of actual entities
are not sufficient.' In addition to mono-level ontologies, we may
construct multi-level ontologies, describing worlds which include
two or more layers of actual beings. Such an ontology, I have contended, is necessary for the representation of worlds pervaded by
the sacred. As described by phenomenologists and historians of
religion, these worlds share a clear-cut distinction between the
realm of the sacred and the realm of the profane. In what follows, I
shall elaborate on multi-level ontologies by examining the perculiarities of reference to such worlds. I will then discuss the use of
ontologies within human communities, ontological fermentation
and development, decomposition and clashes, solutions such as
cultural landscaping, reactions. Finally, I will examine the role of
fictional ontologies within the ontological economy of a given
culture.
During the initiation ceremonies, the Kwakiutl neophyte
describes the pole in the center of the worship house as follows: «I
am in the Center of the World....I am next to the Pillar of the
World.» The novice is not making the same type of attribution as a
speaker who, sr eaking about Paris, describes it as «the capital of
France.» The pole in the worship house it not a mere object fulfilling the function of «pillar of the World,» the way Paris plays the
function of capital of France. Think instead of a Frenchman who,
after Napoleon's defeat in 1815, would still refer to him as the
emperor, in a sentence like
(1) The emperor is prisoner at Saint-Helena.

Now, the use of the expression 'the emperor' in (1) can be
understood in at least two ways. First, it may be a referential use of
a definite description, in Donnellan's sense.' According to Donnellan, definite descriptions may be used effectively to refer to individuals even if the properties denoted by these descriptions do not
belong in the strictest sense to the individual. One may successfully
refer to someone drinking vodka by the expression: «the man with
Published by New Prairie Press
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the martini glass.» Similarly, «the emperor» may mean «the individual» who until recently was the emperor of France.» Second,
the expression «the emperor» can be used attributively, meaning
«the unique being who exists and is an emperor of France and the
only such emperor.» When used attributively, the expression 'the
emperor' renders (1)false, since Napoleon resides at Saint-Helena
precisely by virtue of having been deposed. However, the attributive reading has an interesting variant. Consider a devoted
Bonapartist who utters (1); for him the meaning of the sentence
would be something like: «the individual who in his own right and
according to the best interests of France is the emperor, is, due to
unfortunate circumstances, held prisoner at Saint-Helena.» For the
Bonapartist, Napoleon's being the emperor of France is a state of
affairs which belongs to the best possible course of the world. That
Napoleon is held prisoner is an indication about the world's not
having taken its best possible course.
Reference to sacred objects or being via definite descriptions
may equally be classified into these uses. An expression like 'the
son of God' or 'the Messiah' may be used to refer to «the individual Christians believe to be the son of God or the Messiah.»
This is a referential use, which does not necessarily accept the truth
of the predicates. For Christians, however, the expressions are used
attributively: the predicate 'the son of God' is assumed to be true
about Jesus. But notice that along with this assumption goes the
conviction that the fact that Jesus is the son of God or the Messiah
indicates that the world has taken its best possible course. Similarly, the Kwakiutl novice attributes to the pole the property of 'Pillar
of the World' with the understanding that this is so in a very
privileged course of the world. In a certain sense, the state of affairs in which the pole is the Pillar of the World is preferable to any
state of affairs in which this is not the case. For the believers, the
descriptions applied to sacred being and objects contain a reference
to the optimal course of the world. Sacred being and objects satisfy
the description in the best possible state of affairs, from the point
of view of the believers.
If this is so, if in the best course of the world the pole is the
pillar of the world, what about the property pole displayed by the
object? On the profane level, the pole is certainly a pole, but not
just a pole. The attribute receives a supplementary connotation of
«privileged, uncommon.» Due to the sacralization of the object,
for both initiated and noninitiated people belonging to the community, the pole of the worship house is not a pole like the others.
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/8
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Accordingly, in situations where the distinction sacredprofane is present, one notices: 1. the establishment of a special
relation of designation, the «best course of the world» designation,
which denotes the sacred object as manifesting the presence of the
sacred, and 2. the adding of the note «privileged, uncommon» to
the usual attributes of the object, on the profane level. This note is
present when sacred objects are talked about outside their proper
religious function. The Holy Land is called 'holy' even outside
purely religious contexts. The connotation of the term outside such
contexts is «special, privileged, uncommon.»
These two characteristics typically signal the presence of a twolevel ontology, that is, of a complex structure wherein a given object belongs to two different sets of worlds, having in each of these
different properties, functions and ontological weight. The worlds
in which the individual called Jesus, the pole of the worship house,
the grotto at Lourdes exist, but are clearly different from the
worlds inhabited by the son of God, the Pole of the World, and the
Holy Virgin. Interestingly, this difference is there not only for the
skeptic and the materialist, but also for the believer, who often
perceives the world as profane in its texture, but sanctified by the
epiphany of the holy manifesting itself precisely in these «privileged, uncommon» places, the holy spaces where channels open between the two worlds. Sacred beings, holy objects, miraculous or
prophetic grottoes, holy mountains, places of worship, all these
provide for the articulation points where the two worlds meet, in
what one could call an ontological fusion.
By this term I understand a two-level ontology possessing a set
of entities which belong to both levels. It is certainly conceivable
that a fusion be complete, in the sense that all the entities of one
level play a role at the other level. Think of esoteric doctrines
teaching universal symbolism. Within such doctrines, virtually each
object belonging to the literal world has a place in the ontological
framework of a secondary, symbolic world. Under such a view, the
task of the wise is to decipher the place occupied within the hidden
real world by the objects perceived in the world of appearance.
Pushed to the limits, every major religion is a project of complete
ontological fusion. The presence of the holy converts the entire
universe by attributing to each of its parts a religious meaning.
Similarly, scientific projects are often based on complete fusions.
Atomic physics posits an invisible level of reality coextensive with
the world of everyday experience, but structurally different from it.
On the other hand, partial ontological fusions are equally frePublished by New Prairie Press
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quent. The manifestation of the sacred doesn't always take a pancosmic character. Most social organizations tend to limit the expansion of the sacred. When they succeed, the fusion points between
the two ontologies are restricted to the sacred space (temples, worship houses, places of sacrifice), to the sacred objects, and to the
celebration periods (ceremonies, feasts, festivals). The remaining
space and time, the non-holy objects and activities obey only the
laws and constraints of the profane world.
The world view of a given community may thus divide into
several ontological landscapes. We shall characterize an ontological
landscape as an ontology or an ontological fusion which governs a
domain of the collective life. We speak of collective life in order to
emphasize the role of the users of ontologies as human communities in particular socio-historical contexts. The notion of ontological landscape is designed to stress the fact that various communities make different uses of ontologies. Thus, European society
at the end of the XVIIIth century was still keeping the Christian
landscape as an essential element of its ontological territory. This
territory was however much wider than the Christian ontology:even
among those not primarily interested in the progress of science the
rumor circulated that new and disturbing cosmological theories
were being proposed. We might assume safely that most of
Haydn's admirers never managed to study closely the new
cosmology. However, any educated person of the XVIIIth century
could have planned to acquaint the new cosmology, the existence of
which, together with some general characteristic, was common
knowledge. Nonetheless, despite these new territories, it was still
possible to celebrate the beauty of the land which stayed for centuries at the center of civilization. The enthusiasm with which
Haydn's Creation was received cannot be explained otherwise. The
oratorio must have been perceived as a magnificent opportunity to
explore the old ontology, so beautiful, so close at hand, so reassuring.
III

Conversely, one may easily think of a situation where, after
having lived for a long time around an ontological fortress, a certain population starts to spread around on a much wider surface.
The steep rock, by now uninhabitable, on which the founders had
built the impregnable castle, is declared a historic park; its only use
is as a tourist attraction. However, in a certain sense, this castle
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/8
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may serve as center and emblem for the expanding region. Doesn't
geocentric cosmology play a similar role in our time?
The image suggested by the preceding remarks is that of an ontological pluralism, whereby the users of ontologies have a choice
between several ontological landscapes. In fact, however, the
freedom of choice appears to be subject to some constraints. In
most periods, people have a rather deep and stable feeling that they
live in an ontologically coherent world. If most societies seem to accommodate or at least to authorize some diversity in the ontological landscapes, there are, however, means to indicate that only one of these landscapes represents the ontology proper, or central. Neighbouring ontologies always lead to a process of ontological focalization, to a sorting out, to an ordering of the ontologies in place by the assignment to each of an importance index.
The most important ontology may then play the role of absolute
norm, of a high court which summons neighbouring ontologies for
control and justification. In communities which adopt a certain
sacred ontological fusion as their central ontology, while still keeping other peripheral models, the chosen sacred ontology would
serve as ultimate truth and regulating principle for the remaining
models. When conflicts arise, the peripheral ontologies have to
yield. In typical European villages, for instance, popular beliefs in
local spirits, witchcraft, etc., coexisted with the new system; even if
they were tolerated at the periphery, the slightest danger of expansion or conflict was severely repressed.
Seen from this angle, orthodoxy wasn't as much the defense of
a single ontology as the protection of a certain ontological focalization, of a certain ordering of neighbouring ontologies. But, when
one observes the large number of beliefs and heresies condemned in
the name of one focalization or another, one cannot avoid the impression that ontologies are in a continuous state of fermentation,
change and degradation, in a permanent movement, against which
the only defense is the dogmatic reinforcement of a certain
focalization. Thus, rigidity in the religious organization,
dogmatism of any sort, probably have their origin in the need for
stability and occasional normalization of the ontological landscape. Enforcing ontological stability is one of the most important
tasks of religious, intellectual and artistic super-structures.
Now, the patterns of ontological organization seem to reduce
to a few current types. Central ontologies may vary between two
extremes: fusions and literal ontologies. We saw that a fusion is a
two-level ontology in which every element of one level plays a role
Published by New Prairie Press
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at the other level as well. A literal ontology is a one level construction; it assumes it represents faithfully all and only what there is.
Both fusions and literal ontologies may be in turn strong or weak.
A strong literal ontology claims to be the only faithful representation of all and only what there is. An example of strong literal ontology is the hard-core positivism, especially in its earlier versions.
A weak literal ontology may coexist with other weak literal ontologies or even with other fusions: a more tolerant philosophy of
science can thus accept more than one literal representation of what
there is. It can even accommodate religious representations of the
world.
At the other end of the spectrum, within strong fusions, the
sacred ontology tends to cover the whole surface of the profane
one, as may be the case in the wholly sacralized world of archaic
communities. In weaker fusions, the two levels come in touch with
one another only selectively. The educated Christian of the end of
the XIXth century believed in a universe governed by natural laws:
the sacred ontology retracted to a few isolated points, where the holy timidly inserted itself into an entirely foreign texture. Religiously
oriented philosophy solves this encircling either by withdrawing into the existential moral field, since, according to this choice, the
true place of the sacred is in the interiority of the subject, or by
positing a sacred center of the world, non-affected by the progress
of the profane. In both cases, in the heart of the literal we face the
epiphany of a metaphor: the unseen, donor of meaning.
Turning now to the peripheral ontologies, we see they fulfill
two functions which may be compared to leisure and sports.
Leisure ontologies, or ontologies for pleasure, derive in most cases
from older, discarded ontologies. Each culture has its ontological
ruins, its historical parks, where the members of the community
relax and contemplate ontological relics. Greek and Roman gods
performed this function till late in the history of European culture.
On the other hand, marginal ontologies may be used as training
grounds for different ontological tasks. Thus, one of the functions
of literary, and more generally, of artistic fiction is to train the
members of the community in such abilities as rapid induction,
construction of hypotheses, positing of possible worlds, etc.
Communities appear to more or less consciously arrange their
ontological space according to principles of landscape architecture,
or rather of ontological urban planning. Strong fusions may be
compared to the use of natural landscape by communities where
life is still close to nature. Weak fusions resemble XIXth century
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cities, where the inhabited space was clearly separated from green
spaces, to the extent that city dwellers lived and breathed in different places. Strong literal ontologies eliminate landscape variety,
similar to the futuristic city from which the vegetal realm would
have been excluded. Finally, weak literal ontologies may be compared to our contemporary chaotic cities with their heterogeneous
neighbourhoods scattered around, linked only by highway networks.
Thus, ontological planning aims to avoid or at least appease
the open conflict between different ontologies. It rationalizes to
some extent the irrationality of the ontological space; as a consequence, such questions as «is proposition p true or false?» can be
relativized to such and such an area of the general landscape. At the
beginning of our century, a proposition like «Christ is a man-god,»
the truth of which was unquestionably at the center of a strong fusion such as XIIIth century philosophy, remained true within the
space arranged for this kind of sentence, without however being
true everywhere in the ontological landscape, just as the activity of
breathing fresh air, which at some point in human history was
coextensive with most human activities, became restricted for the
dwellers of the modern megalopolis to certain times and places.
And similar to the social rules of behaviour which prescribe
special leisure activities dedicated to the periodical consumption of
fresh air, there exists in complex ontological landscapes a sort of ontological rules of etiquette which indicate in some detail which propositions should be assented to in various contexts and situations.
Thus, the propositions which are obviously true in Church on Sunday morning, are impolitely so in different contexts, such as, say,
professional meetings.
Notice also that ontological planning may trigger hostile reactions. There is, indeed, a certain cultural condition which may be
called ontological stress. Caused by difficulties of orientation
among the complexities of modern ontological arrangements, this
type of stress leads to the weakening of our adjustment to ontological landscapes. Its first patient was Don Quixote, unable to
tell apart actuality from fiction. In our time the ontological distinctions became much more subtle and complex. The modern city
dweller travels long distances between the places where he works,
and those where he lives and relaxes. Likewise, the user of complex
ontological arrangements has to travel between heterogeneous, if
not plainly hostile landscapes, to which he is expected to adjust
rapidly and for short periods of time. The worlds of our Churches,
Published by New Prairie Press
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of our political parties, of our psychological counsellors, of our
various sets of friends can considerably vary in their inventories of
beings. Our capability for ontological adaptation cannot tolerate
more than a certain amount of change. When the threshold is
reached, there come reactions, interestingly similar to the reactions
vis-à-vis the pressure of modern city-life.
These vary between two limits: anarchism and passeism. Ontological anarchism interprets the changes from one landscape to
another as indicating a complete absence of ontological order. To
the ontological anarchist, each landscape is only the deceitful
ossification of one kind of illusion. Each ontological perspective is
considered by the anarchist from the point of view of its
unavoidable negation. To establish oneself somewhere, to dwell in
one of the ontologies, constitutes for the anarchist the most serious
error. Paul Feyerabend's epistemological stance is the most articulate expression of ontological anarchism.'
Conversely, the passeist deplores old times when ontological
stability was still there. Nostalgics of different persuasions, craving
for the age of innocence, for the age of cathedrals, or for any other
similar past projection of their anxieties, are attracted by what they
perceive as the simplicity of assent these periods asked for.
IV

The anarchist assumes that the simultaneous presence of
several types of ontological landscapes cancels the credibility of
each ontology. Their multiplicity proves that they are all fictitious.
Choice between these fictions is made according to purely
utilitarian criteria. Any ontology is good, provided it serves a certain purpose; marginal or obsolete landscapes have the same right
as central ontologies. In turn, by rejecting ontological multiplicity,
the passeist, in his own way, considers the surrounding ontologies
as mere fictions, at least in comparison with the overthrown

dogma.
Now, the term 'fiction' is used in the last few sentences in a
special way, as synonymous with `error.' Users of ontologies
however, spontaneously make the distinctions between fiction and
error on the one hand and between fiction and truth on the other.
In the light of the previous considerations, this last distinction
shouldn't be understood as radically opposing some entirely true
ontology to its false alternatives. Especially, this distinction
shouldn't be interpreted as opposing rationalist-scientific onhttps://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/8
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tologies to religious ones. Indeed, for the homo religiosus, myth
represents absolute truth; moreover, many modern users adhere to
both packages of religious and scientific propositions. Today, it is
not difficult to find individuals or groups equally assenting to
«Christ is both man and God» and to «the Earth moves around the
Sun.» However, at least within a certain normality, it is impossible
to believe in the same way these two sentences and «Sherlock
Holmes lives on Baker Street.» To deny the divinity of Jesus or the
movement of the planets around the sun means to propose a new
arrangement of the ontological landscape by disrupting the
organization of the sacred or of the established ontology. To deny
the existence of Sherlock Holmes, however, doesn't affect the ontological territory. Holmes is there in order not to exist.
V

Our discussion pointed out to the considerable variety and
fermentation of ontologies. Changes occur, conflict arises, solutions have to be made up. The notions of ontological landscaping
and ontological planning were proposed as sketchy representations
of the ways ontological conflict is kept under control. I also stressed that fiction is not coextensive with non-literal ontologies. What
then is fiction?
One way of approaching the question is by examining the use
of fictional ontologies. It appears indeed that ontologies can have
more than one series of users. Let us call the people for whose
needs an ontology is devised, its primary users. Due to various
cases, a given ontology may cease to be assented to by its primary
users, thus losing its truth. This does not necessarily mean that the
whole construction, the entities, their properties, their history, etc.
are irrevocably discarded. A deposed ontology may find its secondary users, who would employ it as fiction. Mythologies survive
this way. Nelson Goodman once suggested that we should replace
the question «what is art?» by «when is art?». 8 Likewise, one might
be tempted to just ask «when is fiction?» and to answer along the
above-suggested lines: «fiction is when discarded ontologies find
secondary users.» But, correct as this answer may be for situations
such as the one mentioned, it still misses an important part of the
picture.
For, if fiction were only a special use of ontologies produced
elsewhere and later abandoned as obsolete, how could one explain
the striking fact that as far as we know most societies maintain
Published by New Prairie Press
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some sort of non-religious fictional activites, such as the «laughing
stories» of the Cherokees, fables, anecdotes, etc. To derive these
from older disused or degraded myths is not always easy: on the
contrary, many folk-stories are just nonmythical stuff, rooted in
the observation of current social life, customs, etc. These fictional
constructions appear to have been designed independently of ontologies whose purpose and use drastically changed over the centuries.
A possible solution to this puzzle would appeal to the notion
of ontological landscaping and planning. We saw that an ontological focalization organizes the beliefs of a community around
a central ontology. Peripheral ontologies can coexist with the central ones, and serve as play or training grounds for the members of
the group. Now, if we take the division of the ontological space into central vs. peripheral ontologies as a very general formal
organization of the beliefs of a community, we may localize fiction
in the ontological space as a peripheral region used for ludic and instructional purposes. The concrete content of the marginal ontology counts less than its position within the formal organization:
fictional space can accommodate almost any ontological construction. Seen this way, fiction is both a pragmatic and a semantic notion: the organization of the ontological space has certainly
pragmatic reasons, but the structure itself is clearly semantic. Also,
what kind of ontology will fill the fictional space is a pragmatic
question: will it be a specially constructed ontology? an old,
discarded one? an actual one used fictionally for a short time? But
the regularities of the peripheral space itself are of a semantic

nature.'
Notice also that in pre-modern societies the veritable activity
of the imagination is found in religious and mythological creation.
The beings and universes invented by the archaic non-religious fiction certainly cannot measure with the luxuriant ontological creation of the myth-makers. Conversely, in modern societies religious
imagination seems to have to a large extent dried up, while fiction
covers vast and diverse territories. Today, past mythologies, past
scientific theories, past and present literary works, sub-literature,
etc. can all be used fictionally. Thus, religious and mythological
richness seems to be compatible with fictional poverty, while fictional fertility may correspond to a shortage of religious and
mythological imagination."
The picture may not be so simple: one has to consider also that
advances in scientific imagination clearly play a role in the shrinkhttps://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/8
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ing of the religious ontological production. It seems however
reasonable to suggest that the creation of nonempirical entities is to
some extent regulated by what one may call the economy of the imaginary, which controls the total amount of idols and fictions used
by a society.
VI

What are the consequences of the above proposals for the
theory of literary fiction?
First, ontological landscaping suggests that there is more than
one kind of existence; conversely, there must be more than one
kind of non-existence. Sherlock Holmes didn't exist, for sure, but
London did and still does." We saw that double-level ontologies
called weak fusions are characterized by the independent existence
of a sacred and a profane level, which come in touch with one
another in a few privileged spots. But this seems to be precisely the
model of fictional ontologies: the fictional level and the level of the
«actual-in-the-world» inevitably overlap in some crucial aspects.
Reality takes part in or is reinterpreted by or is converted by fiction
just as within ontological fusions the profane takes part in or is
reinterpreted by or is converted by the sacred. To submit this does
not amount to an identification of fiction and the sacred: we merely
point to a similarity in their formal ontological structure.
Differences are still considerable; they deserve further exploration. Here are a few suggestions: religious ontologies propose a
model of the world which is fundamentally divided, while fictional
constructions, once granted the willing suspension of disbelief,
generally propose unitary models. The ontological cut in fiction
cannot be seen except from outside. A further difference originates
in the ludic character of fictional ontologies. Worth being discussed
also is the relative complexity of religious constructions as opposed
to the relative simplicity of fictional ontologies.
Further, the above remarks may stimulate reflections on the
functions of fiction. Tentatively, it may be suggested that within a
more general economy of the imaginary fiction plays several functions in turn, according to the relative development of religious imagination. Thus, in societies with a rich religious ontology, fiction
may play a secondary role within the overall imagination activity.
With the gradual simplification of religious constructions, the territory of fiction becomes more and more crowded. It may harbour
discarded ontologies, and function as a privileged peripheral area
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in the complex ontological landscape, providing for both leisure
and training space.
Such reflections can be continued and refined. Are religious
and fictional ontologies meant only to be cult and respectively ludic
objects, or are they supposed to offer, at least to some extent, explanatory models of the world? If so, what are the similarities and
the differences between them? Is fiction only proposing substantive
explanatory models of the world, or does it rather contribute to our
basic training in constructing such models? If the answer is yes,
how is this done and in how many ways? What would be the role of
fiction in an entirely desacralized world? Can fictional ontologies
be dangerous? In what way? These are a few among the questions
my above proposals could lead us to confront.
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